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Abstract
We highlight the role of natural resources in the services sectors of countries that possess
them by specifically incorporating these resources into a model of service provision
where domestic incumbents and a foreign entrant compete. We find that domestic firms
control most of the market share when natural resource prices are likely to go up but that
industry output drops. However, the output of the services industry rises when natural
resource prices are likely to increase but that the foreign firm gains market share in this
situation. This suggests that a government focused on the growth and development of its
economy should prefer liberalization when natural resource prices are likely to be higher.
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1. Introduction
The Uruguay Round of trade talks is credited with bringing services into the fold of
world trade rules. Services, which encompass a wide array of activities—from banking
and telecommunications to engineering and legal services— and that account for almost
two-thirds of all economic activity in some countries are clearly important for both
developed and developing countries. The General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) applies to access and competition policies in services markets, which account for
more than $4 trillion of total trade (BOP basis) according to the World Trade
Organization. Trade in services is expected to grow rapidly in the future. In fact, trade in
services is said to be regularly underestimated because conventional methods do not
account for the role services play not only in the trade of goods but also in the trade of
other services such as finance (Deardorff, 2001).
The GATS in its current form is a work in progress. While it provides the opportunity for
comprehensive policy binding, member countries reserve the right to determine the
breadth and depth of the commitments they want to make and specify market access and
national treatment obligations. Since the domestic regulation of service sectors plays a
significant role as a barrier to trade in services, even liberalization achieved through the
GATS leaves substantial room for individual member countries to impede free trade
through the use of appropriately designed regulatory policies. This can be done under the
guise of the need to maintain quality, protect consumers, and practice prudential
regulation. This flexibility in the GATS, while playing an important part in launching the
agreement, has also been a problem because of a lack of access commitments made by
member countries. Many of the commitments that have been made find their root causes
elsewhere. For example, the Republic of Korea’s commitment to liberalize the financial
services sector can be traced down to the country’s accession to the OECD (Dobson and
Jacquet, 1998).
Given this context, it is no wonder that analytical literature that deals with trade in
services has started to emerge. However, it is still in its early stages and, compared to the
theory of trade developed to make sense of trade in goods, it is rather scarce. Some
notable studies include Hindley and Smith (1984) that argues for the applicability of
comparative advantage principles to services trade; Deardorff (1985) that checks the
assertion made by Hindley and Smith and concludes that comparative advantage applies
to services trade under certain conditions; Markusen (1989) that emphasizes the role of
knowledge intensity; and Markusen, Rutherford, and Tarr (1999) and Brown, Deardorff,
and Stern (2000) that incorporate returns to scale and product differentiation.
While Ricardian theory holds up well for services trade in many circumstances, the fact
that numerous service industries are regulated and the classification in the GATS of
commercial presence in the target market as a medium for international trade, makes the
universal applicability of this theory questionable. Moreover, there are some important
differences between goods and services trade. While Hill (1977) distinguished between
goods and services trade by asserting simultaneity in the production and consumption of
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services, the implications of this definition are fairly restrictive. One implication is the
need for the producer and the consumer to be in the same location. Jones and Ruane
(1990) and Francois (1990) model services trade drawing the distinction between goods
and services. However, the GATS envisions trade in services to include the above
definition as well as cross-border consumption. In view of this, Francois and Wooton
(2001), Harms, Mattoo, and Schuknecht (2003), and Konan and Maskus (2004) analyze
the liberalization of services in the context of imperfect competition and domestic
regulation to address issues like cartel behavior and welfare impacts of this policy.
This paper adds to the literature by focusing on the liberalization of services in natural
resource-rich developing countries where resource revenues are used to subsidize
employment in publicly owned monopolies. The case of the telecom sector in Saudi
Arabia is used as illustration. The paper argues that trends in the global market for the
natural resource can have strong implications for market share in domestic services and
the decision to liberalize. This suggests that commitments made under the GATS should
assess tendencies in global resource markets.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on trade and
telecom services with emphasis on Saudi Arabia. Section 3 presents our model of
services trade. In section 4, we discuss the results obtained and then conclude by offering
a summary and some policy recommendations in section 5.
2. Services and Telecommunications Trade
The WTO Working Party pays close attention to the telecommunications sector in
particular when negotiations are carried out for accession to the WTO. Consequently,
market access and non-discriminatory treatment of multinational companies becomes a
significant issue. Service sectors like water, electricity, health care, and
telecommunications that are crucial for the development of an economy as well as to
increasing the competitiveness of export industries are characterized by less competition
than other service sectors. Domestic markets in these sectors tend to be dominated by a
public monopoly. One result of this feature often turns out to be an unfair advantage
favoring the incumbent. This is clearest, for example, in the case of telecom, for the need
of the entrant to connect to the existing network that is mostly owned and controlled by
the incumbent1.
Many services sectors, particularly telecommunications, are characterized by rapid
technical change. This often means that entrenched monopolies in services find it
1

It is worth noting, however, that commitments made by WTO members to services liberalization still
remain quite low. For example, out of the 149 WTO member countries, only 45 have committed to the
liberalization of 80 or more service sectors. This is out of about 160 service sectors and sub-sectors that the
GATS identifies. In addition, revenues from privatization tend to vary across countries. For example, while
Mongolia’s national telecom operator raised $11 million in 1995, Deutsche Telekom went for about $13.4
billion in 1996 (Adlung (2000) quoting Besancon and Kelley (1996)).
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difficult to maintain control over the activities carried out in their sectors. Thus, in many
developing countries, this tilts the playing field in favor of liberalization. However, in the
case of natural resource-rich countries, the urgency is mitigated if the monopolies happen
to be publicly owned enterprises. This is due to the ability of these public entities to
better control alternative technologies given their access to subsidies made possible by
revenues generated by the natural resource2. This gives the government more control over
the decision regarding the possibility and timing of any liberalization of the service sector
according to their economic and political readiness. In the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region, for example, where governments were-and to a lesser extent today
continue to be-employers of last resort, the privatization and liberalization process of
public utility companies has been slow compared to other regions of the world. This has
been especially true in the telecom sector. Figure 1 below shows that while privatization
in the developed countries has been the highest, ITU reports that Arab countries have
been slow to privatize their incumbent telecommunication operators accounting for only
8% of the world’s privatized carriers (partial or total) and the number of countries that
have privatized represent 38% as of 2001. In addition, the percentages of those countries
that allow competition in basic services (such as fixed-line local or long-distance
telephony) are even lower as seen in figure 2 below (ITU-Trends in Telecom Reform
2002)
Fig1: Pe rce ntage of Countrie s That Have Privatized The ir National Telecom Operators
By Re gion (2000)
Am e ricas
74%
69%

Asia-Pacific

53%
40%

Arab State s

38%

Source: ITU World Te le com m unication Re gulatory Database , 2001

.
Fig 2: Pe rce ntage of Countrie s that Allow Com pe tition in Bas ic
Te le com Se rvice s By Re gion (1999)
Europe

39%

Am e ricas

36%

As ia Pacific
Arab State s
Africa

23%
15%
14%

Source : ITU World Te le com m unication Re gulatory Databas e , 2001
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This control can be the result of a variety of reasons including both financial and non-financial; for
example, VOIP (Voice Over Internet Protocol) technology is illegal in several of these countries because it
cuts into the profits of international calls which represent a major chunk of fixed and cellular telephony.
Non-financial reasons include security and culture.
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While privatization is an instrumental tool in the restructuring of state enterprises,
economists warn that privatization needs to be part of a more comprehensive program
that “entails creating jobs in tandem with the inevitable job destruction that privatization
often entails…[Therefore] [t]iming and sequencing is everything.” (Stiglitz 2003). A
good example of this ‘timing and sequencing’ is East Asian countries which took
advantage of globalization by expanding their imports and using the income from the
increased economic growth to gradually and systematically drop protective barriers,
phasing them out only when new jobs were created. These countries ensured that there
was available capital for the creation of new enterprises and jobs and took an active role
in promoting such new enterprises (Ibid).
This East Asian policy seems to be the way that natural resource-rich developing
countries are heading. In expectation of higher oil prices, the rate of privatization in the
MENA region especially in GCC countries has been trending upwards. This not only
reflects the increased income from the export of natural resources-mainly oil-which
increases the demand for private shares, but also reflects the future income expectation of
governments in their efforts to withstand the political costs that are expected to emanate
from the inevitable restructuring of the Telecommunications sector-mainly the cost of
restructuring of the labor market.
Table 1 below shows the actual privatization levels of 2003 and 2004 for the
telecommunication industry measured by the proportional share of total revenues3. The
table shows that the actual level of privatization has been on the rise in the short period
between 2003 and 2004, a period representing the expected rise in world oil prices.4
Notice that while the privatization levels among MENA countries have been relatively
lower among the GCC countries, their percentage change-with the exception of Oman
and Kuwait-over the one year period of 2003-2004 has been among the highest especially
that for Saudi Arabia which represents a 50% change over the previous year.

Table 1
Country

WTO

Telecom

Telecom

Percent

3

This is obtained by the multiplication of each operator’s share of total revenues by the percentage shares
owned by the government, public sector institutions, local private sector and foreigners in the country.
4
The level of privatization and state ownership in each of the above countries is based on the full 2003 and
2004 revenues.
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Jordan
Sudan
Bahrain
Yemen
Syria
Algeria
Kuwait

Egypt
Qatar
Morocco
UAE
Saudi Arabia
Tunisia
Oman

Accession Privatization Privatization Increase
Date
Level (2003) Level (2004)
Apr-00
68%
77%
13%
72%
73%
1%
Jan-95
53%
66%
25%

Jan-95

53%
46%
48%
55%

61%
60%
59%
55%

15%
30%
23%
0%

Jun-95
Jan-96
Jan-95
Apr-96
Dec-05
Mar-95
Oct-00

37%
35%
41%
40%
20%
12%
0%

53%
45%
45%
40%
30%
20%
0%

43%
29%
10%
0%
50%
67%
0%

Source: Arab Advisors Group: http://arabadvisors.com/Pressers/presser-250905.htm

Table 2 shows the monopoly, duopoly and competitor distribution in selected MENA
countries in 2004. It shows that with the exception of fixed telephony, other services are
slowly moving towards liberalization with more impending liberalization in the coming
years. Under the WTO agreement many of these countries are not only obligated to
liberalize but also to privatize and allow foreign investments; Saudi Arabia for example
has three years after accession to the WTO to allow up to 70 percent foreign equity
ownership in the telecommunication sector. This applies to both basic telecom services
and value added ones.
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Table 2
Country
Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Egypt
Jordan
Lebanon
Morocco
Syria

Incumbent
Operator
Batelco
MOC
Omantel
Q-tel
STC
Etisalat
Egypt
Telecom
Jordan
Telecom
MOT/OGERO
Maroc
Telecom
STE

Fixed

Mobile

Data

Internet

M
M
M
M
M
M
M

D
D
D
M
D
M
D

M
C
M
M
C
M
C

C
C
M
M
C
M
C

M

D

C

C

M
M

D*
D

C*
M

C*
C

M

D

M

D

M = Monopoly, D = Duopoly, C = Competitive
*Mostly under the management or BOT contract for the MoPT
Plainly shaded cells indicate monopoly, Diagonally shaded cells indicate further liberalization is
expected (2004)
Source: Booz-Allen-Hamilton: http://www.bah.com

Table 3 shows the cellular competition intensity index (CCII) which assesses the level of
competition in the MENA region’s cellular markets over the past two years5. Notice that
Saudi Arabia represents the highest percentage change over the year between 2004 and
2005. Thus, while the kingdom was relatively slower than some other MENA countries
prior to 2003, it has been moving faster than other countries- especially GCC member
nations like Qatar and the UAE that have low unemployment and are resource rich-in the
liberalization process. Part of the reason for the delay is that the government had no
immediate financial needs for privatization; unlike Morocco, Egypt and Jordan that
started the liberalization process several years earlier, Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich
nations of the GCC countries did not need the privatization proceeds. It was not in
desperate need for money from liberalization. However, the Saudi government in
particular realizes that while it did not need the short-term capital inflow, employment
opportunities for Saudi youth and the economy at large needed liberalization (Arab News
2005).

5

The index calculation incorporates the number of operators, packages and services available in each of the
listed countries and assigns a weight to each category based on its importance as a competition indicator.
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Table 3: Cellular Competitive Intensity Index for Arab Countries
Country
CCII for
CCII for
Percent Increase
2004
2005
Jordan
67%
84%
25%
Algeria
52%
66%
27%
Morocco
59%
60%
2%
Saudi Arabia
Yemen
Egypt
Tunisia

31%
55%
50%
53%

55%
54%
51%
49%

77%
-2%
2%
-8%

Kuwait
Lebanon
Syria
Bahrain
Sudan
Libya
Oman
Qatar
UAE

44%
43%
42%
40%
19%
-23%
20%
14%

43%
42%
41%
36%
32%
29%
26%
18%
13%

-2%
-2%
-2%
-10%
68%
-13%
-10%
-7%

Source: Arab Advisors Group: http://arabadvisors.com/Pressers/presser-250905.htm

Mobile services-analyzed as separate business units-are not only relatively new in the
Arab world but have also been less subsidized by the governments in comparison to other
basic telecom services such as fixed telephony. Because of their recent advent to the
telecom market, they do not suffer from the underemployment that basic services had to
endure. In addition, the demand for mobile services has been on the rise for the past
several years causing a significant jump in market share and a large percentage of the
incumbent monopoly’s profits. As such, they are relatively easier to restructure and
regulate. This is why liberalization of the mobile cellular services has been relatively
more forthcoming. Thus it helps to serve as a testing ground for the overall liberalization
process. Figure 3 below shows that in the period where many fixed line services
remained closed, some form of competition was allowed by 78% of ITU Member States
in providing mobile services by 2002. Of these almost 47% allowed full competition and
31% allowed a duopoly market structure. Thirty five countries (only 22%) continued to
ban competition at that time. And while the Arab countries were the most restrictive in
admitting competition to their respective mobile markets, they were strengthening their
commitments; by 2001 44% of the Arab countries allowed competition, up from 30%
from the previous year (ITU—Trends in Telecom Reform 2002).
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Fig 3: Com pe tition in M obile Se rvice in Arab Countrie s (2002)
100%
80%
60%

Com pe tition

40%

M onopoly

20%
0%
Europe

Am e ricas

As ia-Pacific

Arab State s

Source : ITU World Te le com m unication Databas e (2002)

On the other hand, competition in basic services has been slowest in the Arab world
compared to other regions by 2004-as can be seen from table 2 above-and as early as
2001. While the Europeans had taken the lead with 50% of its countries allowing it,
countries in the Americas and the Asia-Pacific represented 42% and 38% respectively,
while only 15% of the Arab countries allowed some form of competition in such services.
African countries represented the highest leap from the previous year with 34% of its
countries allowing some form of competition; almost a fifty percent increase over the
previous year. However, it is important to note that only a handful of these countries
especially in Arab and African countries had a second fixed line carrier to compete with
the incumbent operator (ITU—ibid). See figure 4 below.
Fig 4: Percentage of Monopoly & Competition
for Basic Services, By Region
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%

Monopoly

40%

Competition

30%
20%
10%
0%

Unlike sectors like agriculture and textiles, where suppliers are better organized than
consumers and are therefore able to effectively mobilize resistance to liberalization,
service sectors like telecom do not face this type of problem of asymmetry. This is
because the consumers of these services are likely to themselves be suppliers in other
sectors with substantial stakes in efficiently functioning sectors upstream in the
production chain. This setup would then be able to counter and perhaps overcome the
resistance to liberalization. Nowhere, perhaps, is this truer than in the case of the telecom
sector, which is widely regarded as the backbone of any economy and critical for
development and growth.
An increasing number of studies now demonstrate the benefits of liberalization and
competition in services. However, protection remains the mainstay in these sectors.
9

Although Laffont and Tirole (2001) suggest that carefully designed barriers to entry can
enhance welfare, the reasons primarily have to do more with political economy and infant
industry considerations. Since public monopolies in developing countries are routinely
used to employ the population, any possibility of restructuring due to liberalization or any
other reason is seen with suspicion as it inevitably leads to a loss of jobs6.
Non-tariff barriers in the form of administrative hurdles and red tape characterize the
trade regimes in the Middle East in general, and Saudi Arabia is no exception. To
facilitate gains from trade it is necessary that trade-related transactions costs be
minimized to the biggest possible extent. Of particular relevance to the telecom sector is
the prevalence of licensing requirements, which often indicate a country’s regulatory
regime. However, there has been a gradual move toward liberalization in countries like
Saudi Arabia and a commitment to the removal of all non-tariff barriers in an effort to
meet the requirements of WTO membership. Living up to its liberalization commitments
in the context of its recent accession to the WTO should prove less challenging given its
current account surplus estimated at $51.5 billion for 2004 according to the CIA World
Fact book and $57 billion for 2005 according to recent estimations. A trade rule relevant
to the services sector is the Foreign Capital Investment Act according to which foreign
capital has the same concessions as national capital. New investment laws to liberalize
the process further are already in the course of being formulated. The main Saudi body
with the responsibility of approval of import licenses in the telecom sector is the
Commission of Information and Telecommunication Technology (CITC). These licenses,
which are for importing wireless sets and radio communications apparatus, serve to
control frequencies. The equipment is required to meet technical specifications set forth
by both the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and Saudi authorities.
To pave the way for accession to the WTO, Saudi Arabia approved a bill in May of 2001
liberalizing the telecommunication sector-a prerequisite for becoming a WTO memberushering in the start of foreign investments and competition. A regulatory agency, the
Saudi Communication Commission, later renamed the Communication and Information
Technology Commission (CITC) was established in 2001 to oversee the telecom market.
The new agency has initiated a process of competition to the Saudi Telecom market that
is seen by some as ambitious given the social conditions and the maturity level of Saudi
economy. In particular, the GSM market which represents about 70% of the Saudi
Telecommunication Company’s (STC) revenue was opened for competition in August
2004 with the entrance of a consortium led by Etisalat of the United Arab Emirates.
Etisalat had submitted a bid of $3.24 billion for the license, the highest bid among the six
short-listed competing consortia. An additional $201 million license fee was approved for
third generation service provision. Etisalat will own 35% of the Etisalat Consortium
Company with 20% of the company’s stock available to the public and the remaining
45% shared between the Saudi General Organization for Social Insurance (GOSI), which

6

An illustrative comparison is that between Egypt and the UK; at around 6.2 million on the payroll, the
Egyptian government employs two thirds of the total work force while the British government, with a
similar sized population, employs only 650,000 (Egypt Investment Report 2002).
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will hold 15%, and multiple of major Saudi companies which will hold the remaining
shares7.
In addition, the CITC has announced that it is opening the door for competition in fixed
telephony by the end of 2006 according to the latest news reports. Other competition in
the telecom sector include two competitors in the data services, twenty two internet
service providers and five VSAT operators8.
The path to liberalization of the Saudi telecom sector has been reflective of the policies of
engagement with WTO negotiations and the current economic and political conditions of
the country. On the one hand, the accession to the WTO will undoubtedly bring in
economic benefits to the kingdom, the last member of the GCC countries to join the
WTO. On the other hand, the competition will require the burdensome task of
restructuring of the old governmental institutions which for over the past thirty years has
been the employer of last resort for its citizens9. The CITC, therefore, was keen on
making sure that not only both the incumbent and the new entrant are profitable while, at
the same time, consumers benefit from the increased competition, but also that additional
competitors are allowed to enter the market. One example that shows such keenness is
the control on downward price pressures administered by CITC in the early stages of
competition; various attempts by the incumbent operator to reduce prices in GSM
services were met with refusal by the Saudi regulator even though such prices were
clearly not anti-competitive when benchmarked by other comparable operators10. The
rationale from a CITC standpoint is clear; too much reduction in prices at this early stagealthough beneficial to consumers-are not so for the industry as a whole especially for the
new entrant that needs to recoup its $3.21 billion investment. Another example of the
government and regulatory policy is the various announcements by high officials with
regards to the entry of additional competitors in both the GSM and fixed services and
their rights to build their own network infrastructure especially the international
gateways-some thing which has been fought over in the Saudi courts (Diwan AlMazalim) between CITC and STC. These latest legal events indicate, on the one hand,
the political direction that the country would like to take given its commitments to the
WTO membership and, on the other hand, the incumbent’s resistance to such measures
given its sense of lack of readiness for increased competition at the publicized time lines.
It is noteworthy at this juncture to point out the inconsistencies that occurred in the Saudi
telecom sector in the past two years; the council of ministers’ (COM) resolution number
171 of 9/9/2003 states in its fifth paragraph that the mobile market shall begin partial
liberalization in the last quarter of 2004, while fixed telephony shall begin (partial)

7

Aljomaih Holding Company, Rana Investment Company, Abdullah & Said Binzagr Company and Riyadh
Cables Group of Companies will hold 6% each of the remaining shares.
8
VSAT stands for Very Small Aperture Terminals.
9
In particular, utility companies such as STC suffer from a serious case of underemployment which was
carried over from the Ministry of Posts, Telephones and Telegraphs resulting in over twenty thousand
employees—a large number when benchmarked with other comparable companies around the world.
10
One of the authors was privy to such meetings when he held the position of Director of Regulatory
Affairs at STC. We mention benchmarking of cost here, because STC does not have a cost structure for its
business units. Accounting separation is one of the directives that STC is supposed to implement.
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liberalization in 200811. This implied-based on international experiences-that any use of
the PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network) and Data networks are to remain a
monopoly until that time. This also implied that the reference to partial competition was
intended to allow for the timely restructuring of PSTN services.12
The unfolding of events, however, proved otherwise. In mid August of 2004, it was
announced by the COM that licenses have been approved for a new mobile operator and
two new data service operators. In addition, it was stated that the new entrants would
have the right to build their own international gateway as well as their own network13. It
was further announced that a third mobile operator would be licensed for operation in the
Saudi market by 200614. Such events can be interpreted as a re-evaluation on the part of
the policy makers of the prospective economic growth lead by an expected continuation
of rising oil prices and the ability to absorb any political cost that may ensue from the
restructuring of the telecom market.
In addition to underemployment of many ex-ministerial/government institutions, there
remains the issue of worker skill especially in the telecom sector which is in dire need for
skilled nationals to replace the expatriate workers that currently occupy these positions.
The dilemma, as mentioned earlier, for countries like Saudi Arabia is two folds; one is
the need to promote competition in the services sectors concomitant with the WTO
agreement and commitments; second is the need to balance the liberalization of these exgovernmental sectors with the political fallout of unemployment that will undoubtedly
result from full privatization of these institutions15.
11

The flow of the sentence implies that fixed telephony liberalization will also be partial, but it could also
be interpreted as complete liberalization. There is no English translation for the COM decision.
12
PSTN services have been marginalized through out the world under similar experiences and are certain to
face the same fate in the Saudi fixed telephony market.
1311
It is important to note here that the COM, which in decision number 171 mentioned above, stated a
‘partial’ liberalization has now approved a total form of liberalization for the new competitor. Also, it is
important to mention that this announcement has occurred while the license debate as still pending in local
courts. In its public announcement (PN No. 10/1424 on 15/11/2003) the commission stated that “In
relation to the progressive liberalization of the communications sector in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
("the Kingdom"), the Council of Ministers Resolution No. (171), dated 02/07/1423H, (09/09/2003G),
provides for the opening of the Saudi cellular mobile services market to competition in the fourth quarter of
2004”. There is no mention, however, that resolution no. 171 stated a ‘partial’ liberalization.
14

This announcement was mentioned in several local newspapers in August 2004 (see Al-Riyadh
18/8/2004 issue # 13204 for example) and was referenced in the price cap decision number 43/1425.
15
Despite the favorable analysis of the liberalization of telecom markets in Asian and Latin American
countries which shows considerable job growth in competitive markets (20.8%) vis-à-vis monopolies
(3.2%) and, subsequently, the increase in demand for telecom workers (Wellenius, October 1997), and
despite the argument that governments can launch a retaining program to capture the excess workforce,
Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries differ in two main aspects. One is that much of the technically
oriented telecom jobs are held by expatriate labor at lower demanded wages than nationals. Second, is that
the main source of income for these countries comes from one main natural resource, i.e., oil, the prices of
which are relatively unstable, and not from major good or service industries as is the case of Latin and
Asian countries.
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The question then is the following: Given the need to enter and commit to the WTO
membership, what is the path of liberalization that a government should adopt in order to
mitigate any political fallout that can result from the labor market restructuring. The
short-run strategy for countries in which governments have traditionally been the
employer of last resort is to ensure that any such restructuring can be accomplished
during the time of high income from its natural resources. In other words, for the telecom
service industry that suffers from underemployment, the regulatory strategy would be to
allow competition not only in accordance with what the market can contain, but to
regulate prices in such a way so that all the market players-especially the incumbents-can
retain reasonable profits. This strategy is likely to take place at the early stages of
liberalization where governments still hold the majority of the incumbents’ share and
revenues from natural resources are not sufficient to compensate for rapid restructuring
efforts. On the other hand, the path to liberalization should take a faster approach when
income from natural resources are high and the government can, therefore, absorb the
costs of restructuring. Such restructuring will not only mean the repatriation of labor, but
also the need to put in serious plans for raising the level of education and improving the
technical skills of nationals for taking up positions in the telecom sector in replacement of
the current expatriate labor force16. In addition, this requires restructuring the overall
economic base; this means diversification of the economy so as to reduce the risk of oil
dependency and move towards a developed economic structure; this is the long-term
strategy outlook that must be adopted.
The model in the next section describes the outcome of entry of a foreign firm given the
economic and political setting described above.
3. The Model
Service sectors in many developing countries consist of publicly owned enterprises. For
example, the finance sector is often comprised of several national banks that operate as a
cooperative oligopoly. In contrast, sectors where the service is the provision of utilities—
electricity, water, telecom—mostly contain one publicly owned monopoly. Keeping this
imperfectly competitive market structure in mind, we develop a simple model of foreign
entry into a domestic services market. The focus of the model is on deriving the effects of
competition on the incumbents and implications for policy for a government whose goal
is to maintain the viability of the publicly owned firms. The model, therefore, does not set
out to study the impact of liberalization on welfare. Instead, the analysis attempts to
identify conditions under which it would be most desirable for a country to meet its WTO
obligations to liberalize while, at the same time, safeguarding its interests in the
incumbent firms. In particular, the model investigates the role of natural resource prices
in these service markets of countries that are endowed with natural resources.
We consider a regulated home market where a homogeneous service is provided by n
identical domestic firms and a single foreign firm. The foreign firm faces costs of
establishing itself in the home country and barriers to providing the service to domestic
16

A December 13, 2005 issue of the Saudi Newspaper ‘Arab News’ indicates that 26% of the $148 billion
revenues for 2005 will be spent on education and training according to the Saudi monarch underscoring the
importance of an educated and skilled workforce. It is also reported that the 2005 budget surplus is
estimated at $57 billion.
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consumers. These barriers can be taxes that foreign firms are required to pay on each unit
sold by them in the home market. However, domestic regulation and bureaucratic red
tape as barriers to services trade are better interpretations given the much more
significant role these play in services trade and the GATS. While it is possible in many
cases to provide the service across borders (referred to as mode 1 in the GATS) without
establishing commercial presence (referred to as mode 3 in the GATS), establishment
costs do not affect the decisions of the foreign firm for maximizing profits in our model.
We employ a simple linear market demand function given by:
P = x − y (nq h + q f )

(1)

The quantities produced by the two types of firms are appropriately subscripted with h for
the home firms and f for the foreign firms. We use these as our subscripts to differentiate
between the domestic and foreign firms throughout the paper.
Marginal costs of both domestic and foreign firms have two components. Both types of
firms have constant economic marginal costs denoted by c. In addition, the foreign firm
pays a per unit cost t due to the barriers it faces in providing the service in the home
country as discussed above. Domestic firms, on the other hand, face an
‘underemployment’ cost u in addition to the economic marginal costs. These
underemployment costs reflect employment subsidization in the domestic firms by the
government. Thus the government uses revenues it earns from the sale of its natural
resources to absorb some of the unemployed in the economy into the publicly owned
service providers. Labor is employed in this manner to score political points for the
regime in power. This underemployment cost depends on the price the natural resource
fetches. So, when the natural resource price is high, revenues from their sale are high and
therefore the cost to add people to the payroll of the domestic firm is low (i.e., it is easy
to finance this underemployment or, in other words, to subsidize the domestic firm). A
lower natural resource price corresponds to a higher underemployment cost. The price of
the natural resource is stochastic from the point of view of the foreign firm. Its stochastic
behavior from the standpoint of the foreign firms is based on the observation that
countries that supply natural resources on the world market are one of handful suppliers
and consequently have at best substantial control over prices or at least superior
knowledge regarding their future movements. Since a country like Saudi Arabia wields
considerable (though not total) control over oil prices, domestic firms are in a position to
have a fairly good idea of which direction—up or down—oil prices are likely to go into.
Hence, u is stochastic from the point of view of the foreign firm that has access to market
analysis that assists in attaching probabilities to the high and low price events. The costs
for the foreign firm are given by:
c f = (c + t ) q f + T

(2)

The firm has entry and establishment costs given by T and marginal costs given by (c+t).
The costs for the domestic firms are:
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c h = (c + u H )q h with probability θ
(3)
c h = (c + u )q h with probability (1 − θ )
L

Domestic firms incur high underemployment costs u H when natural resource prices drop
with probability θ and low underemployment costs u L with probability (1 − θ ) . Note that
uH > uL .
*
H
Let q h (u ) denote the optimal quantity choice of the domestic firm when
*
L
underemployment costs are high, q h (u ) when they are low. For the foreign firm, it is
*

simply q f . Under Cournot assumptions, the n domestic publicly owned firms cooperate
with each other and solve the following profit maximization problem:

[(

)]

max x − y (nq h + q *f ) − (c + u i ) q h , i=L, H
qh
The foreign firm solves:
max π
qf

f

[(

(

]

))

[(

(

]

))

= θ x − y nq h* (u H ) + q f − ( c + t ) q f + (1 − θ ) x − y nq h* (u L ) + q f − ( c + t ) q f − T

The first order conditions obtained from solving the preceding maximization problems
are:

[

(

)]

[

(

)]

q h* (u H ) =

1
x − yq *f − c + u H
2 yn

q h* (u L ) =

1
x − yq *f − c + u L
2 yn

q *f =

[

(

(4)

(5)

)

1
x + θ yn q h* (u L ) − q h* (u L ) − ( c + t ) − ynq h* (u L )
2y

]

(6)

Using (4), (5), and (6) we arrive at the following equilibrium conditions for quantities,
price, and profits in our Cournot model.

[

]

[

q h* (u H ) =

1
1
x − c − uH −
x + θ u H + (1 − θ )u L − c − 2t
2 yn
6n

q h* (u L ) =

1
1
x − c − uL −
x + θ u H + (1 − θ )u L − c − 2t
2 yn
6n

[

]

[

]

]

(7)

(8)
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q *f =

[

]

(9)

1
y

x(1 + ) − (1 + y )c − u H + y (θ u H + (1 − θ )u L − t )

2
2


(10)

1
x + θ u H + (1 − θ )u L − c − 2t
3

P* = x −

(

)

π

*
h

= P * − (c + u i ) q h* , where i=H, L

π

*
f

= P * − (c + t ) q *f − T

(

(11)

)

(12)

We now proceed to analyze these results. More specifically, we examine the role of
natural resource prices and trade barriers and the implications for the decision to
liberalize.
4. Analysis and Implications
The equilibrium conditions derived in the previous section can now be used to analyze
the effects of natural resource prices and fulfilling commitments under the GATS
(interpreted as changes in trade barriers here) on output and market share, service price,
and profits. Since the subsidization of unemployment depends on natural resource prices,
which therefore influence the output decision of the foreign firm, we begin with an
examination of the impact of changes in the probability of movements in the price of the
natural resource. Recall that θ is the probability of high underemployment costs and thus
low oil prices in the future. Simple comparative statics applied to the equilibrium
conditions derived in the previous section yield the following results:
∂ q h* (u i ) 1 L
=
u − u H < 0 , where i=H,L
∂θ
6n

(

∂ q *f
∂θ

=

(

)

)

1 H
u − uL > 0
3

(13)

(14)

∂ P*
y
= − uH − uL < 0
∂θ
2

(15)

∂ π h*
∂ q*
∂ P*
= P * − (c + u i ) h + q h*
∂θ
∂θ
∂θ

(16)

(

(

∂π
∂θ

*
f

(

)

)

= P − (c + t )
*

∂ q *f

) ∂θ

+ q *f

∂ P*
∂θ

(17)
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Te results above provide important and relevant information. From (13) and (14) above,
we see that as θ increases, i.e., as the probability of ending up with high
underemployment costs (or a low price of the relevant natural resource) increases, the
quantity the domestic firms produce in equilibrium goes down. However, the higher θ
becomes, the higher the quantity the foreign firm produces in equilibrium. This means
that if the world market perceives that natural resource prices are going to go up,
domestic firms would produce more and the foreign firm would produce less. In addition,
(15) shows that an increase in θ lowers the equilibrium price. Given the linear demand
function in the model, this implies that the equilibrium output of the industry increases.
But since an increase in θ leads to lower domestic output, this means that the foreign
firm gains market share by increasing production by more than the decrease in the output
of domestic firms. The opposite holds if θ decreases—industry output drops but
domestic firms gain market share. Hence, if the government wants to meet its WTO
obligations to liberalize while minimizing the loss in the market share of the publicly
owned incumbents, the best time to do it would be when world natural resource markets
anticipate prices to go up. If we additionally believe that the foreign service provider
builds infrastructure when it increases output and gains market share, the host country
gains without the government taking an active role in infrastructure provision. We now
complete our analysis by discussing the effects of changes in θ on profits.
Note that (16) and (17) above have not been signed as positive or negative. Several
factors determine the ultimate sign. We therefore take a closer look at these expressions.
Case 1. We proceed first by assuming that the difference between the price and marginal
costs for both domestic and foreign firms, i.e., ( P * − (c + u i )) in (16) and ( P * − (c + t )) in
(17), is positive. Using (13) and (15), it is clear that under this assumption, (16) is
negative. Hence, an increase in θ here reduces the profits of domestic firms. This
supports the suggestion above that the government would find it more acceptable to
liberalize when natural resource prices are increasingly likely to go up.
For the foreign firm, the effect of a change in θ is still ambiguous. Therefore, the right
hand side of (17) can be greater than, less than, or equal to zero. We start with the last
case by writing the following:

(P
Multiplying both sides by

*

− (c + t )

∂ q *f

) ∂θ

+ q *f

∂ P*
= 0
∂θ

1
and some simple algebra allows us to write:
P*

(P

*

)

− (c + t )
1
= *
*
P
ε

Here, ε * is the price elasticity of demand for the service and the term on the left hand
side is the price-cost margin for the foreign firm. The expression above is well known in
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the industrial organization literature as the pricing rule for a monopoly. This makes sense
in our model since if the left hand side is equal to the right hand side above, the foreign
∂ π *f
firm is a monopoly and
= 0 , implying that perceptions of the world market
∂θ
regarding the price of natural resources do not affect the profits of the foreign firm. This
would be true if the foreign firm is operating alone in the services market with no
domestic firms competing against it.
If the first term exceeds the second term in equation (17), foreign profits depend
positively on θ while they have a negative relationship if the magnitude of the second
term is bigger than that of the first. In either case, the likelihood of foreign profits
increasing with increasing θ is higher, the higher the price-cost margin relative the
inverse elasticity of demand. This means that whether foreign profits go up with rising θ
depends very much on (1) how efficient the foreign firm is (as reflected by its economic
marginal costs, c) and (2) how high barriers to delivering the service to domestic
consumers are for the foreign firm (as reflected by t). In short, a positive relationship
between θ and foreign profits is more likely to exist the more efficient the foreign firm,
and the lower the barriers to delivering the service. This also means that the possibility of
lower future natural resource prices alone is not sufficient for the foreign firm to
anticipate higher profits. In fact, if the foreign firm is not very efficient, or if domestic
regulation governing the services sector is too restrictive, then even the likelihood of
lower future natural resource prices is not enough to ensure higher foreign profits.
However, it is important to point out that a higher θ does lead to higher output by the
foreign firm and, as noted earlier, ultimately a bigger market share.
Case 2. Reversing the assumption we started with, i.e., now assuming that the difference
between the price and marginal costs for the firms is negative, the relationship between θ
and foreign profits clearly becomes negative. Higher θ therefore means lower profits.
This makes sense since if marginal costs exceed the equilibrium price and output is raised
with rising θ , profits would indeed go down. For domestic firms, the situation is similar
to the discussion for the foreign firm under Case 1. That is, we obtain the monopoly
pricing rule for n=1 (the pricing rule for a cartel with n cooperative firms when n>1)
when domestic profits are independent of θ implying that there is no foreign firm in the
market. Domestic profits are more likely to drop when θ increases if home firms are
either very inefficient or if the cost of subsidizing underemployment is very high. Again,
we observe that the impact changes in θ have on home profits rests also on home firm
efficiency and the nature of the need to appease the domestic population by employing
them in public enterprises.
Bringing the information in the above analysis together, we see that, generally speaking,
an increasing probability of lower future natural resource prices causes home profits to go
down and foreign profits to increase. But this depends considerably on the costs of either
type of firm. Specifically, the above is valid the more inefficient the domestic firms, and
the higher the costs of subsidizing employment in these government run service
providers; and the more efficient the foreign firm and the lower the barriers to service
delivery in the domestic market.
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At a more intuitive level, it is easy to see from (7)-(12) that higher barriers to trade, t,
cause domestic equilibrium output to go up, foreign output and profits to drop, and prices
to rise. Also, as economic marginal costs, c, increase, foreign equilibrium output and
profits go down. For domestic firms, the impact of a change in c on output depends on
the elasticity of the demand curve. This is clear from the partial derivative below.
∂ q h*
1  1 1
 − 
=
∂c
2n  3 y 

(18)

The relationship between domestic output and c is negative if the right hand side in (18)
is less than zero. For that to be true, y should be less than 3. If it is greater than 3, a higher
c leads to higher domestic output. But note that y is the slope of the demand curve.
Therefore, the model suggests that when demand is relatively elastic, decreasing
economic marginal costs lead to higher output while when demand is relatively inelastic,
decreasing marginal economic costs result in lower output. In both cases, profits increase
demonstrating that (18) agrees with classical economic theory.
5. Conclusion and Further Research
The liberalization of services is of increasing interest and concern to both developing and
developed countries. Developing countries that are members of the WTO and those that
are not but aspire to join are required to move decidedly in the direction of liberalization
of services as envisioned by the GATS. In most such countries service providers tend to
be publicly owned and are often used by the government to hide grave problems in the
labor market by hiring the unemployed and moving them into the realm of the
underemployed instead. This approach is used more heavily in natural resource rich
economies that use resource revenues to subsidize underemployment. This paper
analyzes service markets in such countries to shed light on the impact of natural resource
prices on output, profits, and service prices. We find that while all variables of interest
move in the expected direction, it only happens if certain conditions are met. More
specifically, domestic firms lose market share and earn lower profits with increasing
probability of lower resource prices if they are grossly inefficient and if the need to
subsidize underemployment is high. Under different circumstances, lower chances of low
natural resource prices might not be enough to cause a loss in market share and profits of
domestic firms.
Foreign firms gain market share and enjoy higher profits with higher probabilities of
lower resource prices if they are highly efficient and barriers to service delivery, such as
restrictive domestic regulation and bureaucratic red tape, are low. Given a country that
wants to maintain considerable control over its service markets following liberalization,
the government would find it best to open up its markets when the probability of lower
resource prices in the future is high. However, if domestic firms are sufficiently efficient
and if pressures to employ large populations in the public sector are low, the domestic
industry can make profits even if lower future natural resource prices are likely.
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Even when the future price of the natural resource is likely to fall and, as our analysis
suggests, the share of the domestic firms in the markets shrinks while that of the foreign
firm grows by more than the decrease experienced by domestic firms, the country
acquires infrastructure provided by the foreign firm. This not only boosts growth and
development, especially if backbone service sectors like telecom and finance are
considered, but also has the potential of positively affecting employment by offering
more opportunities to the domestic population. In this sense, liberalization is most
beneficial from a development point of view when in fact natural resource prices are
likely to dip.
There are a few directions in which this research can be taken in the future. A relatively
simple variation of our model that relaxes the assumption of the same marginal economic
costs for both domestic and foreign firms can be instructive. It is likely that the foreign
service provider is more efficient than the incumbents and this can have interesting
implications for output and prices that should be worth exploring. Another direction to
consider is solving the model as a Stackelberg game rather than a simultaneous move
Cournot game. This would better capture the advantage that incumbents are likely to have
in the domestic service industry. Finally, since sequencing is a crucial issue in services
liberalization, a dynamic version of this model would be very useful in shedding light on
when the required steps in the liberalization process should be taken to maximize gains.
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